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I. Introduction: is social change accelerating?  
The post World War II period, and particularly the last two decades, have been characterized 
by rapid change in most social, political and economic areas.  Far from witnessing ‘the end of 
history’ predicted by Frances Fukuyama, the last twenty years have seen an acceleration of 
change in most areas.  
 
To start with, there has been a major paradigmatic shift towards the liberalisation of domestic 
markets and the globalisation of the world economy. This shift has taken place through a 
massive application of structural adjustment programs that limited the role of the state in the 
economy, privatised state assets and liberalized labour and product markets in most 
developed and developing countries and, since 1989, in the former socialist economies. 
While in China and Vietnam, transition reforms were implemented in a gradualist fashion, in 
the former Soviet Bloc they were carried out in an accelerated fashion that simultaneously 
entailed a swift redefinition of national borders, the introduction of new political institutions, 
a radical reorientation of the economy and the adaptation of a disoriented population to an 
entirely new way of life. Considerable, if less dramatic, liberalisation was introduced also in 
the labour markets of advanced economies such as Japan, South Korea and Italy that, as a 
result of these policies, experienced greater employment informalisation and instability, 
faster turnover, longer search times and a shorter duration of each employment spell. Second, 
the last decade witnessed also a rapid globalisation of the world economy and, in particular, 
an explosion of cross-border trade and financial transactions. All in all, these changes seem 
to have generated not only some efficiency gains but also growing instability as shown by the 
rise in the cases of currency, stock market and banking crises (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996).  
 
Second, the last two decades recorded extremely fast progress in the field of information and 
communication technology, biotechnology and pharmacology. The price of a memory chip 
fell 1200 times between 1975 and 1990 alone (Pohjola 2001) while progress in biotechnology 
(even leaving aside the controversial GMOs) raised markedly farm yields. Meanwhile, the 
deciphering of the DNA allowed developing a new range of ‘target drugs’ that enhanced 
perceptibly the treatment of incurable diseases. While, most of these changes had favourable 
effects on growth, well-being and longevity, their short-term effects were far from clear. For 
instance, progress in the field of information and telecommunication eliminated millions of 
jobs and exported many more.    
Third, political systems witnessed rapid change too. Following the downfall of socialism, the 
number of countries embracing some kind of political democracy literally skyrocketed. Gone 
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are therefore the systems based on feudal, military or neo-colonial institutions. These 
favourable developments were however at times accompanied by a surge in other forms of 
social instability, as vividly illustrated by the rise in crime rates in Russia and South Africa 
and – more worryingly – in the number of local conflicts and humanitarian crises (Figure 1). 
The world became also increasingly mono-polar and politically integrated a fact that helped 
intensifying the recourse to smart international sanctions (e.g. against Cuba, Haiti and Iraq) 
and of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions.  
 
     Figure 1.Trends in the number of wars by type   
 
Finally, demography has also been a source of important change. While the population 
declined in Europe, it continued increasing at a rapid rate in Africa, the Middle East and parts 
of South Asia. These and other imbalances, as well as the reduced cost of information and 
migration, fed sustained South-North and South-South legal migration, as well as the 
emergence of a massive illegal migration. Growing international migration was accompanied 
by massive regional and rural-urban migration in the developing and transitional countries, as 
symbolized by the acceleration in the rate of growth of slums in most Third World cities or 
by the emergence of an ‘urban floating population’ of 120 million tolerated internal migrants 
providing cheap labour to the construction and service sector of urban China.  
 
On current trends, rapid change is likely to intensify in the future. Indeed, new epochal 
transformations are already on the horizon. For instance, the entry of China into the WTO 
and its further integration in the world economy are very likely to lead over the next 16 years 
to a worldwide inter-sectoral reallocation of some 500 million workers, owing to the massive 
expulsion of Chinese farmers from agriculture and a similar loss of employment in 
manufacturing firms in many middle and high-income countries exposed to the Chinese 
competition. Second, global financial markets seem poised to continue expanding despite 
their high volatility. Meanwhile, the birth of the Euro and the EU enlargement are likely to 
produce considerable effects in Europe and its main economic partners. Finally, the aging 
and demographic decline in the Old Continent will likely lead to an intensification of world 
migration in the years ahead, regardless of the migration policies that will be adopted in the 
countries of origin and destination. Rapid change – in other words – is not over and, indeed, 
it may intensify in the years ahead.      
 
In principle, most of the changes alluded to above had the potential for improving political 
freedom, living standards and health conditions. Yet, some of these changes took place in an 
abrupt and uncontrolled way. For this reason, they weakened the collective and individual 
ability to adjust harmoniously to the new situations and to enjoy the potential benefits of all 
these changes. The difficulties to foresee, understand and harness ‘unmanaged change in 
situation of institutional weakness’ thus entailed considerable health costs, including in terms 
of higher child, adult and elderly mortality. In addition, even when the overall health impact 
of rapid change turned out to be favourable, a rise in social stratification reduced the relative 
health gains of marginal groups with low levels of education, a limited capacity to participate 
in new economic and political institutions or living in remote areas. The combination of rapid 
change and social segmentation therefore often led to a highly skewed distribution of the 
health gains generated by the new changes.  
 
In view of all this, section 2 discusses ten historical and current episodes of rapid change that 
– despite their inherently positive nature and the favourable expectations that surrounded 
their introduction – generated large social costs and a rise in death rates. Finally, section 3 
delineates a tentative theory of how unmanaged change may affect human well-being.       
 
2. A tentative taxonomy of mortality increases triggered by rapid change   
This section analyses ten examples of past or current cases of social change referring  to 
different countries and situations. Their common denominator is that, in all of them, health 
status deteriorated perceptibly, and at times catastrophically, following the introduction of 
supposedly favourable changes leading to more democracy, more rational economic policies, 
migration to richer areas and so on. The paper ignores those negative events such as 
recessions, wars and disastrers that are indeed expected to worsen health status among the 
population affected. The main aim of this review is thus to understand for which reasons and 
through which pathways health deteriorated inspite of the favourable effects expected from 
the changes introduced. Tentatively, one could identify four types of situations:   
 
2.1 Favourable political changes and rising mortality 
Rising stress and worsening mortality have been observed in countries that introduced 
inherently positive political reforms such as the freeing of the slaves in the USA, the 
transition out of apartheid in South Africa, the move to political democracy in the former 
socialist countries and the imposition of smart sanctions aiming at weakening the grip on 
power by oppressive regimes while containing their negative effect on the population.   
 
There a few broad reasons for the observed deteriorations. First, greater “political 
democracy” in itself cannot help improving health status if “economic democracy” does not 
improve in parallel with it or, worse, if the economic base of the disenfranchised populations  
deteriorates Second, “political freedom” may not lead to “political stability”. In shallow 
democracies lacking a well developed network of civil society organisations (associations, 
NGO’s, churches, trade unions, producers associations and self governing bodies) for the 
formation and channelling of consensus, political liberalisation can polarize the political 
competition along ethnic, religious or class lines with the result of raising political instability 
and – in extreme cases – the risk of conflict, as observed in some new democracies of Africa 
and the former Soviet Union. Third, the intended outcomes of political reforms may backfire 
because of their poor design or because their implementation was hampered by unexpected 
shocks.  
 
(i) Rising mortality among the former black slaves in the USA, 1850-1880.  A clear 
example of the negative impact of a positive political change is offered by the abolition of 
slavery in the United States (Meeker 1976). Life expectancy at birth for the blacks declined 
sharply between the last decade of slavery (1850-60) and 1880 due to rising incidence of 
infectious and nutritionally related diseases. The primary reason of this rise in death rates 
was not so much a change in disease patterns or medical practices, but the disruptions in 
social organization and living conditions associated with the abolition of slavery. During the 
slavery, the health and nutrition of the slaves depended on their owners, who had an 
economic interest in keeping them in good health. The health and nutrition of the freed 
blacks, in contrast, were influenced negatively by their inability to obtain medical care from a 
non-existent public health system or from costly private providers. Declines in health status 
were also due to negative changes in housing conditions and the inability of the freed slaves 
to obtain land, a fact that reduced their agricultural output and food intake. Most of them had 
in fact to survive by selling their labour as casual workers.  
 
Thus, while the abolition of slavery was a noble and idealistic decision, freeing the slaves 
without simultaneously ensuring them minimum income-earning opportunities and access to 
basic services turned out to be the cause of avoidable health deteriorations. 
 
(ii) Rising violence during the South African transition to democracy, 1989-2004. South 
Africa’s transition from a supremacist and oppressive regime to a multiparty ‘rainbow’ 
democracy was not an easy one. The country experienced two different, if interconnected, 
transitions. The first was from Apartheid to democracy, the second from an inward-looking 
to a neo-liberal market economy.  
 
As noted by Marais (2001, cited in Desmond and Boyce 2003), the political transition began 
in the late Seventies-early Eighties, with the introduction of a few political adjustments 
motivated by the poor performance of the country and the desire of raising an abysmally low 
supply of skilled African workers whose shortage was seen as a key factor limiting growth 
potential and domestic demand. The subsequent years (1982-7) saw the creation of the first 
political organisations, the dismantling of ‘petty Apartheid’ and the creation of a tri-cameral 
parliament. Despite these concessions, political violence intensified. The state responded 
declaring in 1986 the state of emergency, handing over power to the security establishment 
(Barbarin et al 1999) and launching urban renewal programs in townships characterized by 
high political volatility. This response raised the death rates among both the Blacks and to a 
lesser extent the Whites. By the early 1990s, political negotiation and compromise started 
prevailing, leading to the 1994 elections that sanctioned the end of Apartheid.  
 
The newly acquired political freedom was accompanied by considerable hesitation about the 
choice of policies in the field of nationalisation, land reform, fiscal policy, tax restraint and 
FDI. In the end, the government adopted an orthodox stance giving priority to economic 
growth, relying on the ‘trickle down’ to reduce poverty and emphasizing the provision of 
urban basic services. The neo-liberal nature of economic policies became clearer with the 
adoption in 1996 of the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program that 
focused mainly on private investment-led growth, with no explicit targets for the reduction of 
poverty and inequality.  
 
The restoration of democracy, end of sanctions and election of a government committed to 
social change were expected to affect positively growth, poverty reduction and health status. 
However the existing data do not easily permit to trace the health impact of the transition due 
to long standing registration problems and, more recently, the blurring effect of HIV-AIDS. 
Be as it may, the available evidence suggests that – on balance - the political reforms did not 
improve health status. Three factors may explain this unexpected outcome:      
 
- Rising poverty. Economic performance improved only modestly in relation to the turbulent 
years of 1987-90. Per capita income growth was negative over the entire 1990-5 period and 
turned barely positive since 1996. Meanwhile income inequality worsened (Table 1; see also 
Jenkins and Thomas 2004). As a result poverty increased, with negative effects on health. 
This disappointing performance can, at least in part, be attributed to the legacy of Apartheid. 
Yet, the key issue is that while GEAR improved the macro fundamentals it failed to create 
jobs (Streak, 2004; Terreblanche, 2002). As a result, poverty and inequality therefore 
continued to increase, if at a slower pace, in the second part of the 1990s. 
 
Table 1. Income distribution changes in South Africa, 1991-2001 
Households Share of total income Changes 
 1991 1996 2001 1991-1996 1996-2001
Bottom two quintiles  3.8 3.4 3.3 -11.0 -3.0
Third quintile  7.6 7.4 7.3 -0.3 -0.1
Fourth quintile   17.6 17.4 17.2 -0.1 -0.2
Top quintile   71.0 71.8 72.2 1.1 0.6
Source: Adapted from Terreblanche (2002), p33, cited in Desmond and Boyce (2003). 
 
Public policy deliberately aimed at improving social conditions. Government spending on 
health, welfare, education and housing rose from around 50 percent of non-interest 
expenditure in 1990/1 to an average of 60 percent between 1995 and 2002 (Desmond and 
Boyce 2003). Free health care was made available to pregnant women and small children, a 
school-feeding scheme was started, health care was decentralized and a programme of clinic 
building and renovation was initiated. Though hampered by limited capacity and expenditure 
constraints, these programme were expected to start reversing long-standing health 
inequities. Likewise, the reform of the welfare system was expected to impact positively 
health, but in the end only 20 percent of the poor received a grant owing to limited capacity 
and fiscal austerity (Streak, 2004). Another priority of the new government was to increase 
access to water, sanitation and electricity and as a result the availability of piped water rose 
from 78 to 83 percent between 1995 and 1999 (Desmond and Boyce 2003). Despite these 
improvements, the country experienced two cholera epidemics since 1994, possibly because 
the program did not reach the ultra poor or because consumption remained low because of 
high costs and distance.  
 
With the removal of influx control, migration to already overcrowded townships rose sharply 
due to lack of employment opportunities and violence in rural areas. The new government 
embarked on a massive low-cost housing program that produced over a million new homes 
since 1994, with the result of raising the share of families living in formal housing. For a 
variety of reasons, however, the share of households living in informal housing rose from 7 
to 12 percent during the same period, thus offsetting the impact of the program in reducing 
the spread of TB, pneumonia and HIV.    
 
- Rising crime rate. A second pathway through which the transition affected health status was 
via a surge in violent deaths and political assassinations that increased sharply over 1987-
1990 to subside from the early 1990s. As a result, the cases of political violence in urban 
areas fell from 2500 in 1990 to less than 500 in 1994 (Barbarin et al 1999). Yet, the fall in 
political violence appears to have been accompanied by a rise in criminal violence (ibid.).         
 
The political transition occurred in an environment of widespread violence, easy access to 
weapons, little confidence in an ill-equipped police force and weak capacity of the criminal 
justice system. During the Apartheid years, civil disobedience, boycotts, and even political 
violence were considered by most legitimate tools of political struggle. In turn, the state 
responded to these acts in an even more brutal way. All this contributed to the creation of a 
culture in which violence is the main tool for resolving all political and personal disputes.  
 
The longer term impact of all this was a sharp rise in criminal activity and violent deaths 
between 1987 and 1990 and after 1990. Between 1980 and 1990, the murder rate rose by 32 
percent, rape by 24 and burglary by 31 (Shaw, 1996). In turn, over 1990-4, the number of 
murders fell from 16000 cases in 1990 to close to 15000 in 1994, as the fall in political 
assassinations was almost completely offset by a rise in criminal ones. In addition, other 
crimes continued to increase, with assault climbing by 18 percent, rape by 42, robbery by 40 
and burglary by 20 (ibid). By 1996, hospital records showed a daily average of two and a half 
thousand South Africans received treatment for stabbings, assaults and shootings. Data for 
1994-1997 from two key districts confirm the trend towards falling political brutality but 
rising criminal violence (Table 2). Finally, Barbarin et al, (1998) argue that the fear of being 
attacked while at home or in the street has risen for all ethnic groups, and that fear- and 
stress-related mortality may be another channel through which the transition affects health. 
 
Table 2. Crime rates (per million) in two South African Locations, 1994-1997   
 1994 1995 1996 1997 %change 
1997/1994 
Gauteng 
Personal crimes 153.1 160.5 160.6 160.9 5.0 
Property crimes 334.6 344.2 337.9 339.7 1.5 
Sexual crimes  12.4 13.8 14.9 14.6 17.9 
Public violence  0.33 0.31 0.19 1.33 0.0 
Soweto 
Personal crimes 142.3 140.4 139.5 145.4 1.5 
Property crimes 125.4 118.2 124.2 133.1 6.4 
Sexual crimes  15.8 17.4 18.2 17.4 10.4 
Public violence  0.69 0.22 0.15 0.17 -75.7 
Source: Barbarin et al (1999) 
 
- HIV/AIDS and the transition. Over the last 15 years South Africa’s biggest health problem 
has been an uncontrollable epidemics of HIV-AIDS. There is no doubt that the epidemic 
would have occurred regardless of the transition, but the latter may have accelerated its 
diffusion. The removal of influx control, political violence and reforms-induced urbanisation 
increased mobility within the country, thus facilitating the spread of the epidemic. Second, 
the increase in rape associated with political violence may have fuelled infections. Third, the 
inefficient management of the health care system during the reform process reduced the 
quality of medical assistance and may have contributed driving up the rates of infection  
(Desmond and Boyce, 2003). Fourth, by attracting most of the public attention, the transition 
inadvertently contributed to a neglect of the disease and of the initial signs of its diffusion.  
 
While the overall effect of the transition was certainly positive, path dependence and poorly 
designed economic policies did not allow achieving better health outcomes. In turn, fiscal 
restraint prevented the full benefit of changed expenditure priorities being realised.  
Therefore, while if compared to no action, health outcomes have most likely been better 
because of the transition, they are quite possibly not what they could have been.     
 
(iii) the imposition of sanctions on Cuba, 1992 to date. The US embargo against Cuba was 
introduced in 1961 and is the longest-lasting embargo in modern history (Garfield and 
Santana, 1997). At the beginning, the embargo had a limited impact on the living standards of 
the population because most Cuban trade was with the Soviet Bloc, because of the assistance 
provided by the Soviet Union and because of egalitarian policies in the allocation of scarce 
food and medicines. Indeed between 1961 and 1991 health status and other social indices 
improved steadily and significantly. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the COMECON 
and the cancellation of Soviet aid greatly weakened the Cuban economy, whose GDP 
declined by 35 percent between 1989 and 1993.  
 
The impact of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, that made the US embargo substantially more 
stringent, has therefore to be seen against this background. Prior to the tightening of the 
embargo, about half of the proteins and calories for human consumption were imported. With 
the drop in imports, only about 1200 calories per capita were provided by the low-cost 
rationed distribution. The nutritional situation thus continued to worsen until 1994 when 
private agricultural markets were allowed to operate. In addition, the vulnerable groups were 
covered by targeted rations and other nutritional measures, and by some international food 
aid. The policy of prioritising the needs of children, however, raised the nutritional deficit 
among adult men. However, also the proportion of newborns weighing less than 2500 grams 
rose from 7.3 in 1989 to 9.0 percent in 1993, reversing in this way a 10 years of gradual 
progress in this area. Undernutrition was also one of the main factors in   an epidemic of 
optic neuropathy that affected more than 51.000 people since 1992. 
 
The economic decline of the 1990s caused also a fall in the availability of materials and 
products needed to ensure clean water. From 1990 to 1994, the share of the population with 
domestic water connections declined for the first time from 83 to 81 percent in urban areas 
and from 30 to 24 percent in rural areas. As a result, mortality from diarrhoeal diseases per 
100.000 people rose from 2.7 in 1989 to 6.8 in 1993. International donations and imports 
made up subsequently for the deficit in chlorine production and in 1995 87 percent of the 
municipal water systems were chlorinated.                
 
Poor nutrition and deteriorating housing and sanitary conditions led to a rise in the incidence 
of tuberculosis, from 5.5 per thousand to 15.3 per thousand in 1994 while the shortage of TB 
drugs raised by 48 percent the number of TB related deaths over 1992-3.  Likewise, over 
1989-93 deaths due to infectious and parasitic diseases rose by 67 percent and those by 
influenza and pneumonia by 77 percent.      
 
Lack of fats formerly imported from the Soviet Union resulted in severe shortages of soap 
products and in a surge in pediculosis and scabies. Soap substitutes made with caustic soda 
and other chemicals and stored with improper labelling caused a surge in unintentional 
poisoning. Reductions in public transport due to lack of spare parts induced a 28 percent fall 
in motor vehicle-related deaths while bicycle-related deaths rose by 78 percent. Overall, 
mortality per 1000 inhabitants rose from 6.4 to 7.2 over 1989-94, entailing some 7500 excess 
deaths concentrated almost entirely in the population of over 65 years of age. In all other 
groups, mortality rates remained stable or declined. By 1994, however, the deteriorating 
social conditions began affecting other age groups as well. And in 1995 infant mortality rose 
slightly due a greater incidence of diarrhoea and respiratory problems.        
 
Garfield and Santana (1997) conclude noting that while some of the mortality changes and 
health problems described above were caused by the economic crisis of 1989-92, the 1992  
tightening of the embargo sharply aggravated the situation. Imports of key medical or other 
items became impossible and required much higher shipping charges while foreign suppliers 
were strongly discouraged to deliver any good to Cuba. While the health impact was limited 
by the priority assigned to the protection of children and women, the embargo hit a new 
vulnerable group of adult men and the elderly. The lesson here is that the political sanctions 
were quite inefficient as they did not manage to weaken the Castro regime while imposing a 
considerable – and possibly unwanted – health cost on the elderly population of Cuba.  
 
2.2 Market reforms and health crises  
In some cases, the introduction of economic reforms generated negative health outcomes. A 
first explanation of this unexpected trend is that reforms were applied under “conditions of 
incomplete markets and institutions”. Another explanation focuses instead on the problems 
caused by “incomplete reforms” as the changes introduced were only a subset of those that 
needed to be introduced. This means that each reform taken alone does not necessarily 
generate improvements that depend on simultaneous changes in many areas. A third 
explanation concentrates on the “sequencing problem” that arises when reforms are 
introduced in the wrong order. This problem is well-known  in macroeconomics (when, for 
instance, the liberalisation of capital movements takes place before macroeconomic 
stabilization is achieved) or in transition economics (when price liberalisation and 
privatisation were introduced before competition reforms were introduced). A final 
explanation focuses on the workers’ and entrepreneurs’ “inability to adjust” to sudden and 
unanticipated changes in economic circumstances.  
 
(i) growth, autarchy and mortality in Nazi Germany, 1932-1938. During the 1930s 
Germany experienced an all-but-unknown, and yet substantial, increase in the mortality rate 
of almost every age group (Baten and Wagner, n.d.). The standardized death rate fell from 
100 in 1928 to 93 in 1932 (the last year before the Nazi takeover) but then rose gradually to 
102 by 1936 to remain at 101 in 1937 and 1938. While infant mortality declined over 1932-7, 
that of children of 1-5 years of age rose moderately and that of children 5-15 markedly (Table 
3). The mortality increase was too substantial to be explained by racial prosecution alone 
and, in any case, the impact of anti-Semitic measures became particularly evident only after 
the 1938 tightening of racial laws. The mortality surge was particularly evident for infectious, 
parasitic and nutrition-related diseases, as well as for circulatory and respiratory diseases 
(especially pneumonia) and violent causes.   
 
Table 3. Standardized death rates for all causes for selected age groups, Germany 1932-7 
Age group 1932 death rate (per 1000) 1937 death rate (per 1000) Percentage change 1932-7
0-1 79.18 64.36 -18.7 
1-5 4.50 4.65 3.3 
5-15 1.40 1.59 13.6 
15-30 2.66 2.61 - 1.9 
30-45 3.98 4.02 1.0 
45-60 10.39 10.54 1.4 
60+ 53.63 55.25 3.0 
Source: Baten and Wagner (n.d.) 
 
Though over 1933-37 GDP grew officially by 55 percent, aggregate consumption rose by 
only 19 percent as a large share of the new output was appropriated by the regime to finance 
an expensive rearmament campaign and the strengthening of the state. Even such lower 
increase in aggregate consumption should have led to better living standards and health status 
for most of the population. This increase in average consumption was accompanied, 
however, by a drop in the disposable income of low-income groups. At the same time, 
however, overall employment rose. All in all, while the private consumption of the low-
income groups did not rise as fast as aggregate consumption, there is no evidence that it 
declined to an extent such as to cause the deterioration in health status mentioned above.   
 
A second explanation of the deterioration in health status focuses on the decline in leisure 
time and increased work effort. While during the Weimar Republic the trend was towards a 
shorter working week, over 1933-1938 this increased by 3.4 hours. Work intensity rose as 
well. Authors cited in Baten and Wagner (n.d.) attribute to rising work exertion and the 
related surge in workplace accidents and sick-leaves among workers most of the rise in 
mortality over 1932-7. Yet, even this factor cannot explain fully the mortality changes 
reported in Table 3, as the age group whose mortality rose the most was that of children 5-15 
years of age, while that of people of working age rose less or remained unaltered. One needs 
therefore to focus on additional explanations.   
 
One of this is that the government expenditures on rearmament increased at the expense of 
other expenditures, public health included. While the number of doctor per person remained 
broadly constant (but declined when the Jewish doctors were revoked their license) and while 
the Nazi regime reduced considerably infant mortality, the success in dealing with mortality 
among older children was much smaller, particularly for infectious diseases.  
 
A third factor was the shift to autarky, a decision entailed that substantial food imports be 
curtailed, particularly foods with a high protein and fat content. Indeed, it could be argued 
that the rearmament of Nazi Germany entailed a switch from the import of food to that of raw 
materials (iron) for rearmament. In addition, in order to marshal the support of the industrial 
workforce, the prices of many agricultural goods were kept low through administrative 
regulations, with the result of discouraging private trade and compressing trading profits. 
German farmers had to deliver a large quota of their output at artificially low prices to state 
parastatals dealing with the commercialisation of farm output. This discouraged production, 
raised the incentives to increase food self-consumption among farmers and increased black 
market operations. As a result of the policy of restricting the imports of protein-rich foods 
and of controlling the prices of several farm products, there was a distinct decline in average 
protein consumption per capita. The coastal areas – that were more dependent on protein 
imports - were the most affected. The urban areas also suffered perceptibly while the rural 
areas were little affected. The indicators of protein shortage by region tend to correlate 
strongly with the changes in mortality during the Nazi years. 
 
(ii) the difficult economic and political transformation of the former socialist countries 
of Europe, 1989-2000. 1989 marked the onset of the epochal transformation of the former 
socialist economies of Europe into liberal market democracies. While the months preceding 
the beginning of this historic event were characterized by widespread hopes for 
improvements in living standards, the subsequent years brought about an unprecedented fall 
in output and incomes, the rapid impoverishment of large sections of the population, rising 
inequality and widespread social dislocations. Over 1989 and 1996 alone, the number of poor 
and unemployed in the region rose respectively by 100 and 10 million while the crime rate 
tripled (UNICEF, 2000).  
 
The impact of these developments was dramatic. With the exception of Slovenia, during the 
first reform years (1989-91) male life expectancy at birth fell in all European economies in 
transition. While in Central Europe male life expectancy started to recover in 1991-92, in the 
rest of the former Soviet bloc the fall continued until much later (Table 4). In 2000, male life 
expectancy was still lower than its 1989 level in eight of the 16 countries included in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Changes in life expectancy at birth in 16 transitional economies of Europe, 1989-2000 
 Male Life Expectancy at Birth Female Life Expectancy at Birth  
 Maximum LEB 





Maximum LEB Loss/ 




Czech R.       …   +3.5 -0.6 n.a. +2.9 
Slovakia ... +2.3 -0.2 n.a. +2.0 
Poland ... +3.0 -0.7 n.a. +2.5 
Hungary ... +1.7 -0.4 n.a. +1.8 
Slovenia n.a. +3.1 +0.7 n.a. +2.4 
GDR ...   +0.7* -0.9 n.a.  +2.0* 
Bulgaria -1.5 (1996) -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 (1997) +0.2 
Romania -1.3 (1997) +0.5  0.0 n.a. +1.8 
Estonia -4.0 (1994) -0.6 -1.3 -1.6 (1994) +1.4 
Latvia -4.5 (1994) -0.4 -1.4 -2.3 (1994) +0.8 
Lithuania -3.3 (1994) +0.8 -0.6 -1.4 (1994) +1.9 
Belarus -4.6 (1999) -3.4 -0.3 -2.6 (1999) -1.7 
Moldova -3.7 (1995) -1.6 -1.2 -2.6 (1995) -1.1 
Russia -6.6 (1994) -5.2 -0.7 -3.3 (1994) -2.3 
Ukraine -5.0 (1996) -3.6     -2.0** -2.3 (1995) -1.4 
Kazakstan -5.5 (1995) -4.1 -1.3 -3.6 (1995) -1.8 
Source: Author’s elaboration on  the MONEE database (www.unicef-icdc.org) 
Notes: * 1989-95. ** 1991-92. ‘...’ indicates that the maximum loss was that realized over the first two reform 
years. n.a. means that the country has recorded steady improvements throughout the transition. 
 
Of particular concern is the situation of the Slavic countries of the former Soviet Union 
(Figure 2). In Belarus, male and female life expectancy at birth declined every year between 
1989 and 1999. In the aftermath of the August 1998 financial crisis and devaluation of the 
rouble, Russia experienced a new reversal in the male life expectancy trend that, by late 
2002, was still falling. Ukraine follows a broadly similar – if less pronounced - pattern. 
 
 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13






Even in Central Europe, the loss of human life during the first reform years was non 
negligible. Relative to the death rates prevailing in 1989, the former GDR and Poland 
recorded about 6,000 and 8,400 ‘excess male deaths’ over 1990 and 1991, and Hungary 
registered 10,300 ‘excess male deaths’ over the 1990-93 period (UNICEF, 1994). After this 
initial surge, however, mortality rates declined steadily. As a result, over 1989-2000 these 
countries recorded 400.000 fewer deaths than expected on the basis of the standardized death 
rates prevailing in 1989. At the same time, the countries of Southern Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union recorded over 4 million ‘excess deaths’ mostly caused by an epidemic 
of heart diseases, sudden deaths due to circulatory problems and strokes and violent causes 
that affected young (20-40 years) and mature (40-60 years) male adults.  
 
The main factor in this unexpected mortality crisis was the acute psychosocial stress endured 
by much of the population during the difficult years of adjustment to a new political, 
economic and social order. Stress is a condition that arises when person have to adjust to new 
situations over which they have no control and for which there are no coping strategies.  
Stress is traditionally a key factor in ‘sudden deaths’, that is deaths due to heart problems and 
hypertension, alcohol psychosis, neurosis, homicide, suicide, accidental deaths, ulcers and 
cirrhosis of the liver, i.e. the main causes of mortality observed during the transition. 
 
The stressors which correlated most closely with the observed mortality changes include 
‘unexpected unattended unemployment’ and other adverse labour market changes such as the 
spread of unregulated labour markets and fast job turnover (Cornia and Paniccià, 2000).  
Unemployment affected health through the loss of income, skills, cognitive abilities, 
motivation and self-respect, as well as because of rising anxiety about the future and an 
erosion of social norms that caused an increase in crime rates among the jobless (Sen 1997).  
 
A second source of stress was a rise in ‘undeserved income inequality’, i.e. inequality 
unrelated to differences in talent, effort and human capital. In the economies of the former 
Soviet Union and South-eastern Europe, the Gini coefficient of income distribution rose by 
an astounding 10-20 points and that of the asset distribution by even more. In these countries, 
mounting social stratification strengthened the ability of the new elites to resist taxation, thus 
reducing the ability of the state to provide law and order and social services. Second, high 
inequality eroded social cohesion, trust, mutual support and collective action, i.e. factors that 
enhance health status by promoting the diffusion of health information, exerting a control 
over deviant health-related behaviour and criminal activity and providing interpersonal help 
among community members. Initial regression analysis on the 12 Russian macroregions for 
1989-94 (Cornia, 1996) suggests that a 20-point increase in the Gini coefficient reduced life 
expectancy at birth by 1.5 years, while a 10 per cent rise in unemployment reduced it by 3.5. 
 
Erosion of the family and migration under difficult circumstances were additional sources of 
stress. The percentage of widows and widowers in the adult population rose, the crude 
marriage rate fell and the divorce rate edged upwards by 10-15 percent in Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus, the countries with the highest mortality rises. These changes raised the number 
of people living in incomplete families who are more exposed to stress than people living in 
complete families. Finally, since 1989, nine million people seeking work or political asylum, 
fleeing conflicts or returning from abroad migrated within the CIS countries alone. For many 
of them, migration entailed considerable material hardship, disorientation and loss of control, 
breakdown of social relationships, redefinition of survival strategies, and housing problems. 
 
The changes in stress factors described above often reinforced each other and interacted 
negatively with greater alcohol consumption and reduced access to health services. For 
instance, the faster than average rise in unemployment recorded between 1992 and 1994 in 
the northern part of Russia caused a high labour turnover, the spread of an unregulated grey 
economy, a surge in employment-related migration under difficult circumstances and a rise in 
family breakdowns. All these factors interacted with each other to cause a high level of stress 
and a considerable fall in life expectancy (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Changes in male life expectancy at birth in relation to a stress index summarizing 
changes in unemployment, labour turnover and family completeness, Russia, 1989-93 
 
In conclusion, the peculiar pattern – by age, gender, education and skill level, location, cause 
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of death and time profile – of the mortality crisis of the 1990s suggests that the recent 
mortality upswing in the former Soviet bloc was mainly the result of a poorly managed 
‘adjustment crisis’ where the interaction of changes in unemployment, inequality, distress 
migration and family breakdown caused a sharp rise in uncontrolled stress.   
 
(iii) labour market and welfare reform, instability and suicide: the case of Japan and 
South Korea in the 1990s. During the first three decades of the post-World War II period 
Japan was universally considered a blueprint of full-employment and equitable growth. This 
trend was however reversed starting from the late 1980s, as inequality started rising and as 
rapid growth turned into a decade-long stagnation-cum-deflation.    
 
Two of the measures introduced to revitalize the economy were a lifting of restrictions on 
competition and greater labour market flexibility. Companies were allowed to scrap the old 
lifetime employment system, with its age-based wage scales, in favour of a more flexible one 
rewarding productive workers. However, while these policies were expected to generate 
favourable supply effects, unemployment – unknown for decades – rose steadily from close 
to zero in the late 1980s to 5.4 percent in 2002. The impact was particularly severe, as the 
workers had not anticipated the possibility of loosing their job and did not developed ahead 
of time insurance and survival strategies to face such eventuality. Also, the loss of 
employment was particularly shameful as cultural norms underscored the lifelong attachment 
of workers to a company, a fact that provided in the past considerable ‘structure and purpose’ 
in life.  
   
The rise in inequality and, especially, in unemployment generated a visible health impact. 
While mortality rates for most causes – including for hearth diseases – declined slowly or 
remained broadly unaltered, the number of suicides grew by almost 80 percent between 1990 
and 2000 (The Economist, June 2002; Lamar 2000) with most of the rise taking place in the 
first five years. The number of suicides reached its maximum (over 33.000) in 1999 to fall to 
just over 30.000 in 2000. If one assumes a linear increase in their number over 1990-2000, 
the last decade witnessed 80.000 ‘excess suicide deaths’ in relation to 1990. The increase in 
suicides affected mostly the unemployed, entrepreneurs and managers of bankrupted 
companies (Lamar 2000). This tragic increase cannot be attributed to the material deprivation 
associated with loss of employment. Indeed, most of the affected people were covered by 
social safety nets that – together – with their personal savings would have avoided most of 
the material deprivations generally endured during periods of rising unemployment. The 
mortality increase was instead due to the stress caused by the inability to adjust to historically 
unknown events such as unemployment and bankruptcy and the sense of shame, dejection 
and stigma felt by those who lost their job and – with that – their role in society.           
  
The case of  South Korea exhibits some similarity to the Japanese one, though in this case the 
shock was more sudden and pronounced than in the case of Japan. South Korea suffered in 
fact a perceptible deterioration in health conditions in the wake of the financial crisis of 
September 1997. While the economy returned to its long-term growth path in less than two 
years, the distributive and health consequences of the crisis were nevertheless marked and 
may generate a health impact over the long term. To start with, because of the crisis and 
ensuing adjustment policies, 130.000 state workers were dismissed by the state agencies. In 
the private sector, 55 large companies and several medium sized ones were closed entailing a 
loss of about half a million jobs. The unemployment rate thus rose from 2 percent prior to the 
crisis to 7.6 percent in July 1998 and 8.4 in the first three months of 1999, to return to 4.6 by 
2001. In addition, the share of part time and daily workers not covered by social insurance 
jumped from 42.5 to 52.5 percent between l996 and 2000 and the wage spread by 
employment type widened (KLSI 2001). As a result, between 1996 and 1999, the labour 
share fell from 64 to 60 percent while the Gini coefficient of the distribution of earnings rose 
from 0.29 to 0.32. Job intensity increased too, and so did the number of work accidents (plus 
8 percent over 1998-9), work-related deaths (ten percent increase over 1999-2000) and 
occupational ailments (18 percent increase between 1998 and 1999 alone). Finally, mortality 
by specific causes other than work-related shows an increase in deaths due to is hischaemic 
diseases (that remained almost constant at 5 per 100.000 over 1992-6 but exceeded 10 per 
100.000 in 2001) and in suicides that rose from 5 to 9 per 100.000 between 1996 and 1999 to 
decline in the subsequent two years. Mortality due to traffic accidents declined in line with 
the fall in GDP while that due to hypertension declined and that due to cerebrovascular 
diseases remained constant. In sum, while financial liberalisation may stimulate growth, it 
can also generate severe recessions and devaststing health effects.  
 
(iv) liberalization with inefficient markets and the rise of the suicide rate among cotton 
farmers in the Warangal  District of Andra Pradesh, 1997-2000. In spite of its recent 
success in diversifying her economy, India still depends on agriculture as the main source of 
livelihood for over 70 percent of her population. No surprise therefore that in the 1970s and 
1980s, the years of the Green Revolution, policy making focused strongly on this sector. 
Indeed, the success in raising agricultural output and reducing rural poverty during the 1980s 
depended to a considerable extent on public support in the field of rural credit and inputs 
subsidies and on stable input and output prices.   
    
However, following a severe macroeconomic crisis,  in July 1991 the government introduced 
a new policy approach emphasizing the reduction of state controls and subsidies, the 
enlargement of the role of the market and greater integration with the global economy. 
Within this broad approach, the agricultural reforms emphasized a reduction in price support 
and input subsidies, the encouragement of subsistence farmers to enter input-intensive 
production for the domestic and international markets and the liberalization of imports and 
exports of agricultural commodities. In particular, subsidies on fertilizers, electricity, 
irrigation and credit were reduced, interest rates on farm loans liberalized, and rural banking 
privatised.  
 
When markets are complete and function well, this kind of reforms can lead to a more 
profitable allocation of resources among crops, continuous adjustments to changing market 
opportunities, faster growth of agricultural incomes and better health for most rural dwellers. 
The impact of these reforms was however far less favourable, not so much because of the 
weakness of the safety nets established to deal with the transitory costs associated with the 
liberalisation of agriculture, but because of the inherent weakness of input and output 
markets in India and a surge in un-insured price volatility following the globalisation of 
agriculture.      
 
One of the districts where such impact was most visible is the semi-arid and backward 
Warangal district of Andra Pradesh that experienced a surge in suicides among small cotton 
farmers over 1998-2000 (Table 5). In particular, a study by Sudhakumari (2002) analysed the 
economic circumstances of the households of 50 randomly selected suicide victims who lived 
in 5 Mandals of  Warangal. The study shows that 66 percent of the farmers who committed 
suicide had less than 40 years, an age group characterized by a low suicide rate, while 48 of 
them were male, all were married and belonged to low-income families with limited 
resources and education. Indeed,  31 of them were illiterate, 44 belonged to backward 
communities or scheduled castes, 18 were landless leaseholders and 22 had less than 2 acres 
of land. These data point to a class of ill-trained and financed small farmers who entered 
commercial production without the support needed to deal with the complexity of the new 
productions, or adequate arrangements to withstand the problems caused by incomplete 
markets and volatile world markets.  
 
Table 5. Suicide among cotton farmers in Andra Pradesh since 1997 





Percentage of deaths 
in Warangal 
1997 16 28 57.0 
1998 109 307 35.5 
1999 71 211 33.6 
2000 50 147 40.1 
2001 31 89 34.8 
2002 39 120 32.5 
         Source: based on State Crime Records Bureau, cited in Sudhakumari (2002) 
What led to the increase in suicides? During the period under examination, Andhra Pradesh 
was affected by adverse whether and pest conditions that caused severe crop losses and could 
have – in principle - contributed to a surge in suicides. However, such problems were not 
new and did not cause any perceptible rise in suicides in the past. The cause of the crisis lies 
therefore elsewhere. 
 
Also in Warangal, the drive to integrate subsistence farmers into the market economy 
entailed a considerable increase in the input-intensity of production, particularly in the case 
of cotton a crop that requires improved seeds, electricity, water, fuel, fertilizers and 
pesticides. Expectations of high world prices, encouragement to enter commercial farming by 
local government and distributors of seeds linked to a few multinationals convinced many 
small farmers to shift from low-risk/low-inputs subsistence crops to high-risk/high-cost 
export crops with potentially high-returns. As a result, the area under pulses fell, that under 
wheat and rice stagnated and that under commercial crops rose. For instance, 89 percent of 
the families of the 50 farmers who killed themselves grew only cotton.  
 
Second, the change in crop mix and the subsidy cuts illustrated above caused a considerable 
shifts in the economic circumstances of small farmers. To start with, the input intensity of 
production rose in line with the shift to export crops (Table 6). As four-fifths of the cultivable 
land in the region needs irrigation, the shift to cotton induced a sharp increase in capital and 
recurrent costs for well irrigation. Dependence on purchased seeds increased as well, right 
after seed subsidies were withdrawn, a fact that caused a large rise in seeds costs for farmers.   
 
Table 6. Average Cost of Cultivation in Andhra Pradesh, late 1990s, (rupees per acre)   

































Source: Sudhakumari (2000)  
Third, the purchase of growing amounts of inputs entailed a rise in the borrowing 
requirements of small farmers. While under normal market conditions the latter would have 
counted on a capillary banking system providing credit at competitive interest rates, the 
weakness of the local financial sector, the exclusion o a third of the deceased farmers from 
credit because they did not own the land they cultivated, the retrenchment of institutional 
credit and crisis of cooperative credit pushed the small farmers into the arms of moneylenders 
and pesticide dealers (Table 7) who charged interest rates ranging between 36 and 60 percent.  
 
Table 7. Structure of the indebtedness of the farmers (Rupees)  
Sources Total amount borrowed % of total borrowing 
Commercial Bank  343,012 8 
Co-operative Bank  214,382 5 
Money Lender 1586,430 37 
Pesticide Shop Owner  728,900 17 
Middle Man 1200,542 28 
Private Financial      85,753 2 
Institutes/Friends/Relatives   128,629 3 
Source: Sudhakumari (2000)  
A fourth factor in the Warangal suicide crisis was the volatility of cotton prices. Trade 
liberalization exposed the Indian farmers to the vagaries of global commodity markets, 
without providing them with any mechanism (such as crop insurance or price stabilisation 
funds) to compensate them for swings in world prices and international competitiveness. 
While in 1994-5 the domestic price of cotton rose steeply, it then began to fall, against all 
expectations, since 1997 in line with the decline of world prices and the rise of cheap cotton 
imports. In addition, credit dependence on moneylenders and middlemen forced the indebted 
farmers to sell them most of their output at prices lower than those prevailing on local 
market. According to Sudhakumari (2002), government policies did not help either as they 
allowed the textile mills to import cheap cotton lint despite the existence of a growing 
domestic surplus. Thus, from the perspective of becoming a cotton exporter, the country 
became the importer of cotton produced in countries that subsidized its production and sale.      
 
The withdrawal of input subsidies was a fifth source of economic stress. As noted, after the 
introduction of structural adjustment in 1991, the price of fertilizers doubled while subsidies 
to canal irrigation and electricity were cut. Public investment on irrigation fell to a minimum, 
unloading in this way the cost of irrigation on the farmer. A final factor was the failure of 
public extension services that, during the liberalization suffered a drop in the number of 
agricultural officers. Even though, the agriculture department was well aware that the red 
soils of Warangal were not suitable for cotton cultivation, they never advised the farmers to 
stop growing cotton or bothered to advise them about the proper amount and type of 
pesticides required per acre. As a result, 83 percent of the households interviewed in 
Warangal cultivated cotton on the basis of limited self knowledge or depended for new 
information on unscrupulous dealers of pesticides and seeds who often provided interested 
and inaccurate advice and sold low quality seeds and inputs.   
 
The Warangal story shows that three interlinked factors – the instability of a globalized 
agriculture lacking any insurance or price stabilisation arrangement, declining state support 
to rural credit and agricultural extension, and the absence, inefficiency and interlocked-ness 
of liberalized output and inputs markets - played a key role in raising indebtedness and 
economic desperation among cotton farmers, some of whom in the end committed suicide.  
3.3 Migration, the supply of infrastructure and rising mortality  
A third case in which potentially positive long term changes can lead to a worsening in health 
conditions concerns the acceleration of migration to urban areas. Over the short to medium 
term, uncontrolled migration has been shown it can cause a reduction in life expectancy. 
Indeed, while higher incomes per capita, improved access to public services and enhanced 
collective hygiene generally lessen mortality over the long term, the short-term effects can be 
quite negative. A first cause of this problem is the “rigid supply of social infrastructure”. 
While city-based industrialization offers more jobs and higher wages than in the countryside, 
the inability to expand rapidly water, sewerage and transport services, can raise the incidence 
of airborne, waterborne and infectious diseases in peripheries that have become reservoirs of 
various kinds of epidemics. A second cause concerns the equally “rigid supply of housing”. 
The result is overcrowding in low standard houses and barracks where bad hygienic 
conditions create an inviting milieu for tuberculosis and other infectious diseases. A third 
factor relates to “human behaviour”. Immigrants mostly come from rural societies with 
strong social control and opportunities for deviant behaviour or entertainment much fewer. 
Once in the cities, they can easily be lured into deviant activities or into the consumption of 
alcohol, drugs or other substances that increase the risk of the violent deaths.  
 
(i) rapid urbanisation and mortality in 19th century Britain. An example of deterioration 
in mortality during a period of growth and overall improvement in living standards is that 
observed during the rapid industrial growth of the second and third-quarter of 19th century 
Britain (Szreter 1997). During this period, mortality deteriorated as a result of the disruptions 
caused by rapid urbanization, inadequate development of water and sanitation systems, 
residential segregation, and rising income and wealth inequality. While during the period of 
moderate growth of 1730-1820 nationwide life expectancy at birth rose from 32 to 40 years, 
between the 1820s and 1870s large industrial cities such as Manchester and Liverpool and 
small but fast growing towns experienced an upsurge in mortality. The rise in mortality was 
mainly due to the spread of infectious and waterborne diseases, particularly among the 
infants of new migrants who lived in quarters without safe water supply and adequate 
sanitation. As a result, life expectancy in these cities did not rise, and fell by about one year 
in some of them, despite a steady increase in urban wealth.   
 
More generally, distress migrants – and especially their children - face greater mortality risks 
than people who remain in their community. In many countries, poor migrants often do not 
have the resources to access the rental market and – in the absence of (rare) public 
interventions in the housing sector – end up living in barriadas, slums and bidonvilles – i.e. 
locations that lack basic water, sanitation and power infrastructure. Indeed, because of the 
considerable costs and time required to develop basic urban infrastructure, a rapid surge in 
migration tends to be accompanied by overcrowding and poor sanitation and reduced access 
to potable water. In addition, distress migration entails considerable material hardship, 
disorientation and loss of control due to the inability to operate easily in new environments, 
breakdown of social relationships, redefinition of survival strategies and as a result of all this, 
greater stress. Unsurprisingly, in very many developing countries, while the IMR of urban 
areas is consistently lower than that rural ones,  IMRs in slums – especially slums hosting 
new migrants - are higher than the average for rural areas.  
 
The policy message of the study by Szreter is clear. While ‘governed migration’ has been 
shown to generate considerable welfare gains in both countries of origin and destination 
(Williamson 1996), both now as in 19th century Britain, sudden and uncontrolled surges in 
migration tend to generate considerable pressure on the urban infrastructure and rental prices, 
overcrowding and the risk of spreading infectious, water-born and other ailments among both 
the migrant and local populations.   
 
(ii) rising male mortality during the urbanisation of 1810-1850 in Sweden. Until the early 
nineteenth century, Sweden was an agrarian society dominated by Lutheran values where the 
church exerted a strong administrative and social control on rural folks (Sundin and Willer 
2002). The transition from this pre-industrial society began with the slow urbanisation of the 
early 1800s, though this was not accompanied by any significant industrialization that took 
off only since 1849. Urbanisation gradually accelerated during the first half of the century to 
peak at around 1870. New farming techniques increased productivity in agriculture thus 
releasing part of the rural workforce that migrated to the cities to find jobs as servants, 
unskilled labourers, workers in small foundries or, after 1850, in sawmills and other 
industries.  
 
This migration was accompanied by perceptible demographic and social changes. To start 
with, the difficulties encountered in finding steady jobs in the cities raised the average age of 
marriage among the lower classes as well as the illegitimacy rate, a trend made possible by 
the loosening up of social control and lack of stigmatisation. The crime rate rose too during 
the first half of the nineteenth century in parallel with growing social polarisation and alcohol 
consumption. Violations ranged from minor violence episodes, to aggression against 
members of the upper class, to theft and homicide.  
 
Health status showed important changes during this period. However, while mortality among 
children and women declined, that among adult males rose or stagnated at high levels. IMR 
declined steadily from 190 per thousand in 1810 to 120 per thousand in 1860 (ibid.), thanks 
to rapid growth in food production, the spread of health infrastructure and improved urban 
sanitation (Edvinsson and Nielsson, n.d.). For instance, a growing number of district 
physicians and trained midwives offered greater curative care and actively promoted breast-
feeding, modern childcare practices and child immunisation. In the cities, the decline in 
infant mortality was driven also by improvements in sewerage, garbage collection and 
protection of water sources (this point is however questioned by Edvinsson and Nilsson, 
n.d.). Mortality trend among young and middle age women followed a pattern similar to that 
of children, likely because of the general improvement of nutritional and sanitary conditions 
and the increase in the proportion of births assisted by trained midwives. For older women, 
however, mortality did not decline at the same pace, because of the material deprivation in 
which poor spinsters and widows had to live. 
 
In contrast, mortality among men rose and remained at levels higher than that of 1800 until 
around 1840-50. This meant that the male to female mortality differentials – already high 
prior to 1810 - rose markedly during the first half of the nineteen century (Figure 4). This is 
particularly evident in the case of single unskilled migrant workers. The biggest male-female 
differentials were recorded for deaths due to alcohol intoxication, accidents, violence, 
suicides and tuberculosis. This rise in mortality gap was due not so much to differences in 
income, as men’s salaries were generally higher than those of women, but rather to 
differences in lifestyles. Unmarried men were in fact more likely to adopt unhealthy 
behaviour, while unmarried women internalised gender roles emphasizing a quiter conduct 
and participation in mutually supportive social networks.  
 
F i g  4 .  S e x  d i f f e r e n c e s  f o r  s e l e c t e d  c a u s e s  o f  d e a t h ,  
2 5 - 4 9  y e a r s  o f  a g e .  S w e d e n  1 7 7 6 - 8 0  a n d  1 8 2 6 - 3 0
- 2
- 1 , 5
- 1
















1 7 7 6 - 8 0
 
1 8 2 6 - 3 0
Source: Sundin and Willer (2002)  
 
Secularisation, greater anomia and the decline of other forms of social control accompanied 
the migration to the cities, thus leading to the adoption of more violent and risky lifestyles 
among men. In addition, the old norms of reciprocity and the survival strategies of the 
agrarian society no longer worked in the new locations. Finding oneself in a new milieu often 
generated a sense of being uprooted, especially for those lacking kin networks on which to 
rely in case of loss of employment, illness or other reason. Under these new circumstances, 
alcohol emerged as an important stress reliever.  
 
Although there are no reliable data for the first half of the 19th century, several factors 
indicate there was a substantial increase in alcohol consumption during this period. For 
instance, registered deaths due to alcohol intoxication peaked in the 1840s (Figure 5). 
Contemporary estimates of alcohol consumption, and reports of county governors support 
this view. In towns, alcohol could be bought everywhere at low price and restrictions on 
production and sales were minimal. Certainly, the mortality impact of alcohol consumption 
was greater than that indicated by the registered cases of acute intoxication (Sundin and 
Willer 2002). Heavy drinking affected also nutritional status, housing conditions and 
hygiene. Even lung diseases, stroke, accidents and suicides were in part due to excessive 
drinking.  
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       Source: Sundin and Willer (2002)  
 
Another factor that contributed to the adverse mortality trend among adult males was the 
slow improvement of public sanitation. The development of public water and sewerage 
infrastructure in the new settlements inhabited by migrants lagged in fact behind the growth 
of cities and so contributed to a rise in deaths due to waterborne and airborne diseases.  
 
2.4 Contact and contagion between heterogeneous populations  
Another case in which mortality has been shown to increase is on occasion of the contact 
between highly heterogeneous populations, as in the case of the colonisation of Latin 
America by the Spaniards during which at least 8.4 million Indios perished mainly because of 
the introduction of new pathologies such as smallpox, measles, typhus and tubercolosis (Livi 
Bacci 2004) unknown until then in the region. In all these cases, the main cause of the 
increase in mortality is the difference in epidemiological characteristics of the populations 
that enter into contact, though economic and political mechanisms can play an important role 
as well.   
 
(i) the socio-environmental crisis recorded during the construction of the Panama Canal 
in the 1880s. The demographic crisis that hit Panama City on occasion of the construction of 
the Panama Canal is a good example of the economic, social and environmental imbalance 
generated by the massive influx of workers in various parts of the country, including in its 
rainforest. The arrival of the French Canal Company was expected to generate a favourable 
impact on employment, growth and health. However, in reality, such project led to 
speculative increases in rents and food prices and so made the life of poor Panamanians more 
difficult (Jackson et al., n.d.). In addition, the intrusion into Panama’s rain forest upset the 
delicate balance between urban and forest disease pools. 
 
An analysis of the deaths registers of two parishes shows marked demographic shifts between 
the 1880s and 1890s as well as sharp class differentials in mortality between the poor parish 
of Santa Ana and the better off one of La Merced. Between 1884-9 (the period of the first 
attempt to build the canal by the French Canal Company) and 1889-93 (years in which the 
project was abandoned and mortality returned to its normal level), death rates dropped to a 
third of their level, i.e. from 38 to 13 per thousand in La Merced and from 66 to 28 in the 
poor neighbourhood of Santa Ana. Several diseases contributed to the rise in mortality 
among the residents of the two neighbourhoods over 1884-9. Yet, malaria, yellow fever, 
dysentery (associated to overcrowding and polluted water) and tuberculosis (most prevalent 
among the poor) were the main causes. The increase in mortality affected all population 
groups – both indigenous and foreign workers. Age wise, children were the group most 
affected.      
 
How did the construction of the Canal cause such a health crisis? The influx of thousand of 
West Indian workers caused overcrowding and severe sanitation problems in the urban areas 
of the city. Overcrowding facilitated the spread of contagious diseases, while the 
deterioration of drainage and garbage collection created numerous locations for mosquitoes 
to breed. Since these were the main vector for malaria and yellow fever, the incidence of both 
maladies rose sharply in urban areas. But mortality rose as sharply in the work camps along 
the Canal route, if for a different reason. Indeed, thousands of workers came into contact with 
a mosquito unique to the rainforest and endemic in wild primates living in it. Such mosquito 
acted as the main vector of yellow fever, thus sharply increasing the contagion in the work 
camps.  
 
With the suspension of the construction of the Canal and the exodus of the workers the 
mortality crisis abated. The resumption of the construction of the Canal by the USA 
government in 1903 was not followed by a mortality crisis like that of the 1880s. The US 
government had learned the public health lesson of the first attempt and instituted large-scale 
public health measures to eliminate the threat of yellow fever and other tropical diseases so 
as to be able to continue the construction of the Canal to its completion. President Roosevelt 
dispatched a public health team with the brief of eliminating the mosquitoes carrying yellow 
fever and malaria. This was achieved by eliminating any body of standing water (such as 
water thanks and cisterns), by increasing the supply of running water and through the 
introduction of other public health measures such as fumigation, garbage collection, and so 
on that led, among other things, to the eradication of yellow fever from the area.  
 
3. Conclusions: towards a theory of the health impact of rapid change  
This paper has argued that:  
 
(i) profound social changes such as those observed on occasion of political or economic 
transitions have immediate and profound effects on the health of large parts of the 
population. The analysis of past and current cases of social change confirms that this has 
often caused not only long-term favourable effects but also considerable social dislocations 
and severe mortality crises over the short and medium term.  
 
(ii) the mortality crises that followed episodes of rapid social change or epochal transitions 
affected different social classes, though in the majority of the cases the low income groups 
were most affected. Among the latter one can include the immigrants (as in the case of 
urbanizing Britain and Sweden), canal workers and low income dwellers exposed to 
problems of overcrowding, inadequate housing and sanitation (on occasion of the 
construction of the Panama Canal), newly unemployed workers with low education, living in 
incomplete families and from a minority background (in Japan, Korea and several Eastern 
European economies in transition), illiterate cotton farmers (in Andhra Pradesh) and low 
income pensioners (in Cuba). In some cases, (as in Panama, Japan or South Africa)  the crisis 
affected as well part of the middle and upper class, indicating that while these crises may hit 
particulalry hard the lower strata, the better off social groups cannot consider themselves 
immune from this problem. The evidence suggests as well that the strongest the initial 
stratification, the highest the likelihood that the low-income groups were affected more than 
proportionately, leading in this way to a widening of health inequality.  
 
(iii) the mortality crises reviewed in this paper have generally affected two well-defined age-
gender groups, i.e. adult males and children. The studies on Andhra Pradesh, Sweden, South 
Africa and Eastern Europe show that adult males are especially vulnerable to stress-related 
mortality, their greater vulnerability being due to differences in behaviours and gender roles 
rather than biology. The mortality crises hit also some of the biologically vulnerable groups, 
such as infants and children, especially when the main causes of death were infectious, 
nutritionally related, respiratory and waterborne diseases. Only in a few cases – as in case of 
the trade embargo against Cuba – there is evidence that the elderly were the group most 
affected.   
 
(iv) There appears to be four broad pathways through which social change can affect 
adversely health status, i.e.: (a) due to the unexpected effect of political transitions carried 
out in the absence of adequate administrative, legal and redistributive institutions and a 
modicum of economic democracy; (b) through increased geographical mobility combined 
with the inelastic supply of public infrastructure and housing leading to overcrowding, 
deteriorations in environmental conditions and the rise of infectious and social diseases, (c) 
via the introduction of economic reforms under conditions of incomplete markets and 
missing institutions and (d) due to the contact of different pools of disease.  
 
(v) While the pathways through which rapid change impact the mortality for infectious and 
poverty-related diseases are well known, less is known about the economic and social factors 
that raise stress levels among populations affected by rapid change. Such factors (such as 
rising unemployment in Russia and Japan, or fear of violence in South Africa) are generally 
unexpected as they have never been experienced before or as people have only generic 
expectations about the probability of their occurrence. Unexpected events cannot be insured 
against or prevented through structural interventions. At time, social change is also sudden 
(as in the Korean crisis of 1997), a fact that compresses the response time available to society 
and communities to introduce counter-measures to offset its impact. The policy response to 
the Asian crisis in Korea for instance was sub optimal as the suddenness of the shock made 
that the relief programs were introduced only with considerable delays.  
 
Because of people‘s inability to prepare for and deal with it, rapid change can increase the 
real or perceived sense of uncertainty about the future, the fear about one’s own security, the 
perceived risk associated to human activities, the sense of loss of control and self confidence 
and psycho-social stress. Breakdown in social networks and lack of institutional responses 
and practicable coping strategies tend to aggravate the situation. In addition, growing 
uncertainty has well-known economic effects including an increase in the riskiness of 
investment, a rise in interest rates, and higher saving propensities and risk aversion, i.e. 
changes that depress the current levels of investment and production.  
 
Fourth, rapid change – may increase sectoral and spatial mobility and organisational change, 
increasing in this way anomy and eroding social capital, sense of community participation 
and ability to undertake collective action. In times of rapid change, old rules, norms, and 
institutions no longer function as efficiently as they did before. Informal institutions - such as 
voluntary associations, social networks, the family and other primary groups – are weakened 
with nefarious effects for social stability and security. 
 
(vi) The nature and breadth of public response to the crisis induced by rapid change varied 
sharply. Yet, little is known on why some societies respond in a collective fashion to the 
dislocations caused by social change while others do not. Social stratification as well as 
political ideology affected the willingness ad ability of governments to respond to the health 
crises once these have exploded. For instance, in highly egalitarian Cuba, public policy 
deliberately aimed at containing the health impact of the recession and embargo. In Nazi 
Germany, public policy was ambivalent as it placed a strong emphasis on the well being of 
infants and mothers but not on that of older children. In turn, in the highly polarized Southern 
Sates of the USA, the health and nutrition problems faced by the disenfranchised slaves took 
very long to be solved, as the collective response was almost non-existent. Likewise, in the 
highly unequal economies in transition of the former Soviet Union and South Africa, the 
recent crises were broadly ignored by the national authorities. One of the possible 
explanations of such attitude is that the new elites basically are not concerned by a crisis that 
mostly hit an economically marginal and politically unorganised group of marginal people 
with low education and skills, no jobs, low incomes and limited political representation.  
 
(vii) This paper has also argued that the acceleration of change observed over the last two 
decades is likely to continue in the years ahead. In view of this, the lessons of recent or past 
cases of political, economic and social upheaval constitute a valuable tool for the 
understanding of the potential health impact of those changes that are already on the horizon 
(as the massive transformation that has just began in China) or are likely to emerge (as mass 
migration towards Western Europe) in the near. It is thus essential that the policy makers 
analyses systematically the evidence on the health impact of past institutional changes. Only 
this can constitute an efficient guide to a policy making that aims at preventing important 
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